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Abstract—Slow DoS attacks have proven to pose a significant
security threat to low-resource IoT devices and networks, be-
cause they can be launched by nodes which consume nominal
bandwidth and have limited resource capability. This makes such
malicious attacks easy to initiate, but difficult to mitigate. There
also exists the recurrent likelihood of misclassifying legitimate
nodes, which are incurring slow or poor network connectivity,
as malicious activity. Existing intrusion detection systems (IDS)
for detecting Slow DoS attacks often require the creation of large
datasets for post event analysis. A functional disadvantage of this
dataset-driven approach is the sheer volume of data required, due
to the high number of network attributes and events collated,
which precludes an in-line, real-time IDS detection solution
for live IoT networks. This paper presents an innovative IDS
detection framework for resource constrained IoT networks.
Using a set of only four attributes, a two-step analysis of live
IoT network events enables Slow DoS attacks, in the form of
Slowloris, to be both efficiently and reliably detected in real-
time. In addition, this lightweight IDS framework can accurately
distinguish between malicious and genuine nodes encountering
slow or intermittent network connections.
Index Terms—Internet of things, Intrusion detection, Slow
DoS, Slowloris
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) networks have witnessed rapid
growth in adoption as they increasingly offer application-
layer services like HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) on
top of TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) and IP (Internet
Protocol). Their ubiquity is appealing by virtue of their ease of
operation, mobility, scalability and the generally low cost of
IoT devices. Limited resources, however, concomitantly means
such devices offer restricted security features so IoT networks
are innately vulnerable to malicious attack [1] as highlighted
by the Mirai botnet attack which triggered large-scale web
server disruption [2].
One such malicious threat to web services is the Denial of
Service (DoS) attack, which is designed to flood the target
with large amounts of traffic causing excessive use of limited
memory and processing resources. These high-volume DoS
attacks originate, in many instances, from compromised IoT
devices such as CCTV cameras, and webcams [3], with the
prevalence of these attacks being analysed by [4], [5]. This
type of security threat, where multiple malicious devices
launch coordinated network attacks is generally referred to
as Distributed DoS (DDoS).
Various IoT intrusion detection systems (IDS) have been
proposed to detect DoS and DDoS attacks [6], with most
identifying high incoming traffic volume as characteristic
of malicious activity. This has led to several, open-source
IDS datasets [7] being created, however these contain huge
amounts of post-event network data, with the corollary being
that the resulting high storage and processing requirements
restrict their usage to only offline analysis. This presents
significant challenges to utilising them for real-time IDS in
IoT networks, given the limited resources capability of the
constituent devices [8].
To evade conventional IDS mechanisms, which are tailored
to detect abnormally high volumes of network traffic, attackers
utilise the Slow DoS attack which is a more subtle DoS variant.
This is a legitimate request for application layer services,
but with hostile intent. This makes Slow DoS traffic patterns
hard to discriminate from legitimate traffic [9] so making
reliable and accurate detection difficult. Conventional IDS scan
for anomalies like malformed packets or high traffic bursts
received over a short time frame, but such approaches are
ineffectual for Slow DoS detection because of the latent danger
of misclassifying legitimate traffic as malicious [10] and thus
erroneously blocking network access.
Another critical factor compounding the challenge of Slow
DoS detection in IoT networks, is the generally low traffic
volume and bandwidth requirements, with the corollary being
these threats are often wrongly mistaken for genuine nodes
with either a poor or slow connection [11], [12]. Slow DoS
attacks can be launched from a single threat actor with low
bandwidth and processing power, so their potential impact on
resource scarce IoT nodes, like border routers running web
services, is more severe.
To reliably detect Slow DoS attacks on IoT web servers,
this paper presents an innovative real-time IDS strategy framed
by a critical analysis of TCP/IP traffic within a bounded live
IoT network environment comprising only low-resource nodes.
The solution is more computationally efficient than existing
dataset-driven IDS approaches because of the small number
of attributes employed which leads to a commensurately
streamlined IoT-centric dataset. Furthermore, unlike existing
solutions which involve post-event analysis, this method af-
fords real-time detection. The test IoT network environment
used comprises three node classes; legitimate nodes (LN),
genuine nodes with slow-to-intermittent connections (SN) and
malicious nodes (MN) which are responsible for instigating the
Slow DoS attacks. Experimental results corroborate that Slow
DoS attack traffic can be accurately labelled as suspicious for
further scrutiny as part of a two-step IDS strategy which can
successfully discriminate between MN, LN and SN traffic,
thereby improving the reliability of attack detection in resource
constrained IoT environments, while incurring minimal over-
heads.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section
2 reviews both the nature and characteristics of Slow DoS
attacks, along with current detection methods and IDS strate-
gies. Section 3 details the experimental test IoT environment
used, with Section 4 presenting a critical results analysis of the
new Slow Dos detection technique. Section 5 provides some
concluding comments and further work plans.
II. RELATED WORK
Slow DoS attacks are amongst the most challenging IoT
network security treats because they focus on popular HTTP
servers by exploiting inherent vulnerabilities in key opera-
tional TCP and HTTP parameters. The operation of TCP is
instrumental in realising a Slow DoS attack because it is a
connection-orientated protocol, where each successful connec-
tion undergoes a three-way handshake. Once this process has
been completed, the client and server requests and responses
are initiated to set the parameters required to exchange data.
The server will wait until the application completes the re-
quired tasks, or until a local timeout expires before closing the
TCP connection. It is specifically this connection orientation
and ordered delivery structure that Slow DoS attacks are
designed to exploit. For example, Slow DoS can exploit the
HTTP GET request by omitting the character string that
signals to the server to close the session. By omitting this
string from the client request, the server then must expend
unnecessary resources waiting for a client response.
A. Slow DoS threats
Slow Dos attacks have generated considerable interest [11]
with several mitigation strategies proposed [10], however a
recurring finding is that these types of attacks are difficult
to reliably and accurately detect as they can be characterised
as legitimate users encountering either poor bandwidth or
intermittent node-to-node connectivity, which leads to these
genuine nodes being falsely classed as a Slow DoS attack by
conventional IDS. The incentive for the Slow DoS attacker
is to saturate the target web server with legitimate requests
and expend the available server resources, thus disrupting
operational service. The Apache HTTP web server is one of
the most common Internet servers [13] due to its size and ease
of installation, so is an ideal choice for IoT devices requiring
a web-based interface. To launch a malicious attack on such
web servers, several Slow DoS variants have emerged with the
principal ones being:
• Slow Read: this attack exploits the TCP window size
parameter, so any mismatch in the agreed size means the
attacking client will read responses from the server very
slowly [14] thereby degrading performance.
• RUDY or Slow HTTP Post: this attack sends the POST
data as the message body which is sent back to the
server at a very slow rate, which can be as small as a
single byte per minute [15]. RUDY targets the thread-
based functionality of web servers by occupying all the
available sockets.
• Range attacks: this targets the vulnerability of the range
request function of the HTTP server. The range value is
specified in bytes, i.e., 0-50 and the attacker compromises
the range request header by requesting a long stream of
bytes, where some are illegally overlapping so forcing the
server to waste resources.
• Slowloris: the attacker sends partial HTTP GET requests,
and the server opens a connection, but the attacker
deliberately fails to respond to the server to complete the
connection and holds the socket open until the timeout
value is reached [16]. Multiple connection requests can
then occupy all the available web server sockets. Given
this Slow DoS variant is often mistaken for genuine
network activity when LN have either poor or slow
connections, the remainder of this paper will focus on
this Slow DoS attack, with the next section reviewing
current detection approaches for particular this threat.
B. Slow DoS Detection Techniques
Many Slow DoS detection methods which have been de-
veloped use machine learning (ML) techniques [17], though
these inevitably tend to involve very large datasets with a
proportionally high numbers of network event attributes.
One of key drawbacks of these ML approaches is their
associated processing overheads which are often well beyond
the capacity of typical IoT network nodes. Furthermore, the
ML approach is reliant on historical network data for training
and evaluation [18].
The performance of ML classifiers including Naı̈ve Bayes,
Random Forrest, Decision Tree, K Nearest Neighbour and the
Multilayer Perceptron in detecting DDoS attacks has been
analysed in [9]. This evaluation was performed off-line on
the massive CIDDS-001 (Coburg Intrusion Detection) dataset,
which is a compendium of over 32 million network events in-
cluding benign and malicious traffic. However, only a portion
of the dataset (1.5 million network events) were extracted for
analysis, so the IDS results cannot be pragmatically applied
for evaluation purposes in live real-world IoT settings.
An alternative approach in [11] involved creating Slowloris
attack detection alerts from PCAP (Packet Capture) event
analysis using the minimum value of incomplete HTTP GET
requests. Although this set-up used a live environment, only
simulated traffic scenarios were considered. Packet analysis
has also been used in a signature-based technique [19] to detect
DoS attacks in live IoT networks, however as 14 different
traffic attributes are evaluated, it is a computationally intensive
solution best suited to off-line, post event detection.
In contrast, TCP/IP packet analysis has received consider-
able attention for Slow DoS detection, with [4] proposing an
alternative to unreliable signature-based IDS, by measuring the
expected packet size of the TCP/IP streams. A limitation of
this approach is again the large dataset size used [7] which
is incompatible with resource constrained IoT networks. A
full packet capture approach for low-rate DoS attack detection
has been proposed in [4] by creating a dataset of live traffic
for ML analysis, though the resulting dataset only considered
malicious Slow DoS and legitimate traffic and used numerous
unidentified attributes necessitating a server with 32GB of
memory.
Table 1 summarises the range of different Slow DoS attack
attributes used in existing open source and purpose-built
datasets. Often all these attributes are utilised which inevitably
leads to large datasets that incur significantly more memory
and processing overheads than is typically available for IoT
nodes. Interestingly, while there is notable commonality in
many of the attributes used, neither packet length nor TCP
delta times are widely employed. Also, most of these dataset-
driven solutions involve post event detection rather than in-
line, real time identification, which is a more propitious
strategy for resource scarce IoT nodes.
TABLE I
COMMON SLOW DOS ATTACK DATASET ATTRIBUTES.
This provided the motivation to investigate an efficient
approach to detecting Slowloris attacks in IoT environments,
by both minimising the attributes requirement and considering
real-time live IoT traffic scenarios, where as well as LN and
MN, the causal impact on poor connection SN is critically
appraised. The outcome is an elegant, streamlined IoT-centric
dataset which includes only those TCP/IP attributes sufficient,
yet necessary, to reliably discriminate between benign and
malicious inbound HTTP GET requests, thus ensuring the
solution is computationally lightweight to operate in resource
constrained IoT scenarios. The next section describes the
technical details of the experimental live IoT environment
which was employed.
III. EXPERIMENTAL IOT NETWORK
The experimental IoT network topology shown in Fig. 1 has
been synthesised to generate real time live traffic in a similar
way to [20]. It comprises five nodes; two LN, one SN and
a MN which generates Slowloris attack traffic targeting port
#80 of an Apache web server. The respective technical details
of the network devices used for extraction and analysis are
provided in Fig. 1. While a tightly constrained test scenario,
this topology can be easily scaled beyond the current size
with the inclusion of additional subnetworks. The web server
runs Ubuntu server 20.04.1 LTS with Apache 2.4 installed,
so it has a lightweight operating system appropriate for IoT
environments. All tests are carried out on the webserver based
on its default security and operational settings. To ensure
consistency in all the experiments, each set of tests and
observations for SN, LN and MN activity were recorded over
a period of 420 s.
Fig. 1. Live IoT Network Topography.
Malicious traffic is generated from a SlowHTTPtest utility
with default installation settings on the MN to create the
successful Slowloris attack [20], [21], while for the SN, the
throttle feature of the Google developer tool is utilised to
enforce an indicative latency with intervals between 1500 ms
and 3000 ms, each with 100 kbps upload and download bitrates
to simulate IoT devices incurring poor or intermittent 2G
connectivity.
For the TCP/IP capture and analysis, Wireshark is config-
ured on the network interface card of RPi 4 (Web server) to
extract network packets in PCAP format [21], which is an
industry standard application programming interface designed
to reliably capture live network data packets [22].
A key feature of the extracted dataset from this IoT test
environment is the small number of attributes analysed, which
implies lower resources being incurred, in contrast to the large
dataset examples in Section II.
For accurate TCP/IP traffic identification, both the IP source
address and TCP destination port address attributes are re-
quired, which are collectively referred to as classifier attributes
as their key function is to label each flow. Since Slowloris is
renowned for exploiting the connection session between client
and server, the packet length and TCP delta time attributes
(see Table 1) are the primary focus of the analysis. Thus, two
attributes are used for identification of TCP/IP streams, and
two attributes to detect the Slow DoS attack. A comparative
analysis of Slow DoS packet lengths is given in [23], whilst
[24] evaluated the variance of delta times on the basis that
Slowloris exploits the web server wait and timeout parameters.
This means the connection must be held open until the timeout
value expires, so a longer than normal delta time value is
a valuable indicator of a possible Slowloris attack. The next
section contextualises the new real-time Slow DoS detection
framework, with Slowloris as the MN attack mechanism.
A. Slow DoS Detection Framework
This two-step framework involves just four attributes being
extracted at the ingress point of the network to permit real-
time packet inspection. This not only expedites MN detection,
but avoids the inherent requirement of existing collaborative
detection approaches for using post event (off-node) ML-based
methods. A flowchart of the detection framework is shown in
Fig. 2. Step 1 examines all inbound SN, LN and MN packets
destined for port #80, using three attributes. As previously
mentioned, two of these relate to packet classification, namely
the source IP address and destination port pairs. The third
attribute is the packet length lp where a range of non-
characteristic lp values are analysed, and if germane, labelled
as candidate MN for further scrutiny.
As Slowloris attacks hold TCP connections open without
requesting data, MN packets have a smaller payload compared
to SN and LN packets, so these have a commensurate impact
on the overall packet length. The first detection step thus seeks
to identify abnormally sized packets which are labelled as
candidate MN prior to them undergoing further validation in
Step 2 of Fig. 2. The second step applies a fourth attribute
to the candidate MN list, namely the TCP delta time ∆t,
which measures the time elapsed between non-contiguous
TCP connections. This attribute records the inter-frame arrival
times ∆t, which is the time frame between the end of one
packet and start of the next. Since Slowloris attacks invoke
reoccurring connections during an attack period, ∆t analysis is
used to identify anomalous frequencies in transmissions from
the candidate MN which have been distilled from Step 1.
IV. RESULTS DISCUSSION
Legitimate TCP/IP lp values can be highly variable in nature
depending on their origin, the application payload and the
underlying protocol used, i.e., HTTP or FTP (File Transfer
Protocol). For the analysis here the TCP/IP length, lp includes
a full byte count of each TCP/IP packet. Fundamental to packet
analysis are the SYN (synchronise) and ACK (acknowledge)
Fig. 2. Slowloris Detection Flowchart
flags, which are required for creating legitimate TCP bidi-
rectional connections, along with the PSH (push) flag, which
informs the server to send data. In the case of a Slowloris
attack, once a connection is opened, the MN requests further
data with the express purpose of keeping the TCP connection
open. Since Slowloris attacks closely resemble LN requests,
the first set of experiments investigated the variance in TCP/IP
packet lengths that target application port #80 of the web
server, so an accurate and reliable detection strategy can be
formulated which not only discriminates LN from MN, but
crucially, also can differentiate SN from MN.
A. Packet Length Analysis
The corresponding lp variance results are displayed in Fig.
3 from which it is observed that packets in the range [40,
79] bytes occur with the highest frequency. This particular
range, which contains both SYN and ACK packets, has the
highest proportion of traffic, with LN, SN and MN traffic
appearing similar, so corroborating the judgement [16] that
Slow DoS attack detection for reliable IDS is problematic
when attempting to differentiate between LN and MN, with
SN often being misclassified as Slow DoS attacks.
A study of the mid-range lp values reveals that MN gen-
erated packets recorded in the [80, 159] byte range constitute
≈ 13% of all MN traffic, with an average packet length being
96.4 bytes, while for the LN and SN tested, there is a notable
absence of packets within this range. By considering the next
range of interest, [160, 319] bytes, the corresponding results
reveal that ≈ 14% of MN packets lie in this range, in contrast
to LN and SN traffic which both have much lower occurrences,
with neither exceeding 4%.
When combining these two packet ranges i.e. [80, 319]
bytes, MN analysis indicates that ≈ 27% of all packets are
recorded in this range, which is a significantly higher than for
each LN and SN tested. This provides a heuristic threshold
for labelling such traffic as candidate MN.
A critical evaluation of the Slowloris attack traffic revealed
the presence of open TCP connections where response requests
Fig. 3. TCP/IP lp Variance Analysis.
from the MN existed within the 80 ≤ lp ≤ 319 bytes range.
Furthermore, there were excessive TCP retransmissions with
flags set to PSH and ACK, with each event recording a packet
length lp = 219 bytes. As Fig. 4 shows, this is significant in
being able to identify potential malicious Slowloris attacks,
because it indicates parallel connections have been created
to the web server, implying that more data is to follow, and
thereby keeping the session open.
Fig. 4. TCP/IP Retransmitted Packets
Classifying abnormally high occurrences of packet lengths
within the threshold 80 ≤ lp ≤ 319 bytes range affords an
effective method to identify candidate MN, though there is
the possibility some genuine SN will be misclassified if the
decision is predicated on this single threshold window. This
was the rationale for introducing Step 2 (Fig. 2), where can-
didate MN packets are further inspected to identify suspicious
transmission frequencies, with this frequency analysis using a
wider observation frame than the lp analysis in Step 1.
B. TCP Inter arrival (delta time) analysis
This takes the candidate MN distilled in Step 1 and analyses
their extracted TCP ∆t values. This metric identifies the inter-
arrival period of packets from the test dataset and indicates
MN activity by a recognisable pattern throughout the attack
period. The respective MN, LN and SN ∆t plots in Figs. 5,
6 and 7 represent TCP events in 100 ms increments for an
assumed connection request interval of 10 s. While the overall
volume of traffic during the Slowloris attack is not suspiciously
high, there is a discernible increase in the frequency of TCP
SYN packets, with these appearing as high peak events. Thus,
if Pk is the sequence of high peak events in seconds, Pk
= {pk1, pk2, . . . , pkn}, then by determining the time inter-
vals between consecutive high peak events, pk1, pk2, . . . , pkn,
these can be symptomatic of a recurrent and ordered set of
transmissions.
Fig. 5. MN ∆t plot
Fig. 6. LN ∆t plot
Fig. 7. SN ∆t plot
By observing the ∆t values in the respective MN, LN and
SN plots in Figs. 5, 6 and 7, TCP/IP packets are compared
over a window length of 120 s, from which it is readily
apparent that a higher ∆t mean value is indicative of MN
activity. Furthermore, these numerical results are corroborated
by the visual method used for contextualising suspicious
network behaviour in [25], where anomalous network activity
is identified for further inspection.
As an illustrative example, consider the first 10 obser-
vations of the candidate MN values in the test scenario,
with each high peak event having corresponding values PK
= {17, 27, 37, 47, 57, 67, 77, 87, 97, 107}. This gives a mean
value of 62 s for high peak observations, which is used to
authenticate the candidate MN classifications from Step 1.
This contrasts with the corresponding LN and SN mean values,
which are both negligibly small ≈ 0.7 s.
The significance of this ∆t step is that it not only lowers
the misclassification rates for LN, but also importantly SN
packets. The high frequency Slowloris TCP SYN packets in
Fig. 5. reflect a nominal connection request interval of 10 s,
though in practice, the interval period of Slowloris events will
be dynamic, so presuming MN ∆t values for a given interval
period can constrain the ability to tune the IDS to a predefined
event frequency.
For this reason, the values extrapolated in Step 2 are prag-
matically applied as the threshold to both validate in real-time,
the candidate MN list and minimise SN misclassifications.
This is a novel feature of this IDS framework, with the lp
and ∆t attributes analysed in a computationally lightweight
manner, so in comparison with existing, large-scale datasets
and post event ML-driven solutions, this Slowloris detection
mechanism is propitious for low-resource IoT networks.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented an innovative, real-time IDS
framework for accurately detecting Slow DoS attacks in re-
source scarce IoT environments. A two-step analysis of live
IoT network events reliably identifies malicious Slow DoS
attacks in the form of Slowloris. TCP packets are inspected
at the ingress point of the network and candidate MN packets
labelled for further scrutiny. By capturing and analysing only
a small set of key network attributes for classification, namely
packet lengths and packet delta times, experimental results
verify that Slowloris attacks can be accurately discriminated in
real-time from legitimate HTTP requests without the require-
ment for either massive datasets or post event processing. Cru-
cially, the IDS framework consistently distinguishes malicious
from genuine nodes encountering either slow or poor connec-
tivity. To further generalise this detection framework, future
work will both scale the live IoT network beyond the current
single subnetwork topology along with critically evaluating the
efficacy of this lightweight framework for multiple Slow DoS
type attacks. It will also develop an adaptive mechanism for
tuning the IDS in accordance with prevailing network traffic.
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